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Executive summary 
• On 31 July 1914 in an election speech at Colac in Victoria, the Opposition Leader Andrew Fisher (ALP) 
famously declared that ‘should the worst happen, after everything has been done that honour will permit, 
Australians will stand beside the mother country to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling’. 
• Only days later, Britain declared war against Germany on 4 August 1914. The spark that lit the fuse of war 
was the 28 June 1914 assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 
and the chain of events leading to world war reflected the extremely complex relations between European 
countries in the lead up to the First World War. 
• It is unlikely that Fisher or his contemporaries had any idea of the human and financial sacrifice of Australia’s 
commitment. Overall, 324,000 members served overseas with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) and of 
these, over 60,000 were killed and 156,000 wounded, gassed, or taken prisoner.   
• In 1914, the British Imperial Government remained responsible for the foreign policy of the empire, including 
declarations of war, so the British Government of Herbert Asquith did not need to consult any of the colonial 
governments when making its declaration of war. The Australian Government’s role was therefore only to 
determine the extent of its military contribution to the Imperial forces. 
• However, while Australia’s constitutional independence from Britain has long since been clear, then as now, 
parliament has no formal constitutional role in decisions to go war. The executive power of section 61 of the 
Australian Constitution is taken to include all the ‘prerogatives of the Crown under the English common law’ 
including the power to make treaties with the governments of other countries and making war and peace.  
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Introduction 
On 31 July 1914 in an election speech at Colac in Victoria, the Opposition Leader Andrew Fisher (ALP) famously 
declared that ‘should the worst happen, after everything has been done that honour will permit, Australians will 
stand beside the mother country to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling’. 
Fisher’s speech occurred in the midst of an election campaign scheduled for 5 September 1914, in what was 
Australia’s first double dissolution election.1 When Britain declared war against Germany on 4 August 1914, Sir 
Joseph Cook (LIB) was Prime Minister of Australia. Following the September 1914 election, Fisher took office (for 
the third time) and his government pursued a policy of fully supporting Britain’s war effort. 
This Research Paper considers the context of Fisher’s declaration by briefly outlining the steps leading to the 
outbreak of the war and the costs to Australia by the end of hostilities. It then examines two particular issues of 
relevance in the parliamentary environment: the extent of an independent Australian foreign policy and why 
Britain’s declaration of war was considered to automatically include Australia, and second, the role of the 
parliament in committing Australia to war. 
 
Declarations of war 
The growing dangers arising from nationalist and territorial disputes in the Balkans had been recognised as early 
as the 1878 Congress of Berlin, when German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck famously noted: 
Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men smoking in an arsenal ... A single spark will set off an 
explosion that will consume us all ... I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but I can tell you where ... 
Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will set it off.  
Relations between European countries in the lead-up to the First World War were extremely complex and in a 
state of flux. They reflected the interconnected tensions arising from the growing European dominance of a 
unified Germany, the falling tide of Ottoman power and its loss of European territories in the first Balkan war, 
Russian ambitions for influence and territory in the Bosphorus, and rising nationalist ambitions among Balkan 
nations triggering instability in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.2 
The specific events that provided Bismarck’s spark are well-known. On 28 June 1914, the heir to the Austro-
Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife Sophie, were assassinated by Serbian nationalists 
during a visit to the Bosnian city of Sarajevo, triggering a domino effect of alliance commitments and 
declarations of war.  
Believing correctly that Serbian officials were involved in the plot, Austria-Hungary delivered to Serbia a ten-
point ultimatum. When Serbia agreed to only eight of the ten demands, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July 
1914. In support of its Serbian ally, the Russian Empire ordered a partial mobilisation one day later on 29 July. 
Germany mobilised on 30 July, and Russia responded by declaring a full mobilisation that same day. Germany 
issued an ultimatum to Russia to demobilise within 12 hours, and subsequently declared war against Russia on 1 
August 1914. 
Germany’s war plan was based on the threat of a two-front war against both France and Russia (due to their 
mutual alliance commitments), and relied on a quick victory over France before turning east against Russia. 
When it mobilised against Russia, Germany therefore also demanded that France remain neutral. 
Germany subsequently declared war on France on 3 August. On 4 August, after Belgium refused to permit 
German troops to cross its borders into France, Germany declared war on Belgium. Britain delivered an 
ultimatum to Germany that Belgium be kept neutral, and following an ‘unsatisfactory reply’ declared war on 
Germany on 4 August 1914. 
 
1. G Souter, Acts of parliament, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 137. 
2. The relative importance of these influences, let alone attribution of ‘fault’ are still hotly debated a century later. Several of the many recent 
contributions to the debate include: C Clarke, Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914, Penguin, Sydney, 2013; P Ham, 1914: The year 
the world ended, Random House, North Sydney, 2014; M MacMillan, The war that ended peace: How Europe abandoned peace for the First 
World War, Profile Books, London, 2014.  
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On 3 August Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, delivered a statement to the House of 
Commons on the situation in Europe: 
To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of 
affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany … have declared war upon 
each other … [France is] involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia … . 
For Grey, the question of the neutrality of Belgium was key, given Britain’s ‘honour and interest’ in upholding the 
1839 Treaty of London: 
We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we stand aside … . 
Mobilisation of the Fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the Army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no 
engagement, because I do feel that in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our 
enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the 
unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an 
Expeditionary Force out of the country until we know how we stand … . 
There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this 
war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do 
that. We have made … commitment to France … which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration 
of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely 
satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power.3 
On the centenary of Andrew Fisher’s speech, and in the context of what followed, his immediate and unqualified 
declaration of support for Britain is interesting to us now for three particular reasons: a ‘blank cheque’ policy to 
support Britain’s war effort, the declaration of war by Britain on behalf of the dominions and the role of 
Australia’s Parliament. 
 
A blank cheque 
First, it is unlikely that Fisher had any idea just how costly the human and financial sacrifice of this blank cheque 
policy would be for Australia. 
Overall, 324,000 members served overseas with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). As the Australian War 
Memorial states, for Australia, the First World War remains our most costly conflict in terms of deaths and 
casualties. From a population of fewer than five million, 416,809 men signed up to the Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN) and the AIF, while 2,139 women served with the Australian Army Nursing Service and 130 with the Queen 
Alexandra Imperial Military Nursing Service.4 
By war’s end, over 60,000 were killed and 156,000 wounded, gassed, or taken prisoner.5 This compares with 
around 700,000 British, 60,000 Canadians and 16,000 New Zealanders killed.6  
Australia also had the dubious distinction of suffering the highest proportional losses of any of the national 
forces within the British Empire at 19 per cent losses of the forces committed and 65 per cent of those 
embarked. 7 8 The casualties were still being counted during the 1930s. By then, another 60,000 had died from 
wounds or illnesses caused by the war.9  
3.  House of Commons, 3 August 1914, p. 1824. 
4. Australian War Memorial, First World War 1914—18, www.awm.gov.au/atwar/ww1/, accessed 23 July 2014. 
5. Australian War Memorial, Researching Australian military service: First World War, nurses, 
www.awm.gov.au/research/infosheets/ww1_nurses/, accessed 29 July 2014. 
6. J Beaumont, ‘Unitedly we have fought: imperial loyalty and the Australian war effort’, International Affairs, 90:2 (2014) p. 398, quoting 
Statistics of the military effort of the British empire during the Great War 1914—1920, p. 756. 
7. Ibid., p. 398. 
8. Anzac Day Organisation, www.anzacday.org.au/history/ww1/anecdotes/stats01.html, accessed 23 July 2014. The vast majority of the casualties 
were suffered by the Army. The RAN’s casualties included 171 fatalities—108 Australians and 63 officers and men on loan from the Royal Navy, 
with less than a third the result of enemy action. D Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy, VIC: Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001. 
9. L Carlyon, The Great War, Pan MacMillan, Sydney, 2007, p. 752 
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According to Professor Joan Beaumont, the deaths caused by the First World War, (and those caused by the 
influenza epidemic that immediately followed) changed the demographics of the Australian population: 
The 1933 national census revealed 21,500 fewer men aged 35-39 years—who had been 12-20 in 1914-1919—than 
in the 30-34 year old cohort. The gender balance of Australian society changed too. Whereas in 1911 there were 
109 men for every 100 women between 25 and 44 years of age, in 1933 there were 98 men for every 100 women 
between 35 and 39.10 
The costs of the war to Australia were also financial, with estimated total costs of between £350 million and 
£377 million, of which 70 per cent was borrowed and the rest came from taxes.11 This equates to a figure in the 
order of £170 billion in modern values, although this unsurprisingly seems small compared to Britain’s estimated 
war costs of £3,251 billion. 12 13  
The costs and implications of the war carried on well past the end of hostilities. As well as the debt, Australia 
faced the substantial task of bringing home, demobilising and resettling the large army it had sent overseas. This 
task created considerable administrative challenges, which were driven by both the moral imperative to look 
after all the volunteers who had served, but also the fear the returned soldiers could become a disruptive and 
subversive force in Australian society.14 
The size and complexity of this task necessitated the creation of a comprehensive system of social welfare, 
medical, pension, and soldier settler and pension schemes that significantly changed the role of the federal 
government and its responsibilities in relation to the states.15 
 
A separate declaration of war? 
A second notable issue is that Australia had no choice about whether to go to war. Notwithstanding that the 
Australian Constitution provided that the Commonwealth Parliament could legislate with respect to both 
defence and external affairs (subsections 51(vi) and (xxix) respectively), and the Executive had the broader 
executive power of section 61, the Australian Government knew that the British Imperial Government remained 
responsible for the foreign policy of the empire including declarations of war and the power to enter treaties. 
This reflected the legal status of all of Britain’s self-governing colonies, which also went to war: Canada, New 
Zealand, and South Africa and remained the case in Australia until the enactment of the Statute of Westminster 
(Adoption) Act 1942 (Cth).16 As former High Court Chief Justice Mason noted, ‘the Constitution did not in 1901 
enable Australia to enter into a treaty with a foreign State or make a declaration of war’. Mason quotes English 
constitutional lawyer Sir Athur Berriedale: 
It is perfectly clear that in international law the whole of the Empire is at war if the United Kingdom is at war and 
that it lies in the hands of the Imperial Government to declare war or make a peace. … 
even in 1916, Isaacs J stated that: 
“the creation of a state of war and the establishment of peace necessarily reside in the Sovereign himself as head of 
the Empire”.17 
The extent of Australia’s capacity for independent foreign policy was discussed in the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth power to make and implement 
treaties: 
At federation, in 1901, the power to enter into treaties was possessed by the Imperial Crown because the United 
Kingdom Government remained responsible for the conduct of Australia’s foreign relations … . 18 
10. J Beaumont, Broken Nation: Australia in the Great War, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2013 (eBook edition) location 8953. 
11. L Carlyon, op. cit., p. 759. 
12. The estimate is necessarily very imprecise, www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/relativevalue.php, accessed 23 July 2014. 
13. Total British war debt 1914—1918, BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zqhxvcw accessed 24 July 2014. 
14. Beaumont, Broken Nation, op. cit., location 8544. 
15. Ibid., location 8546. 
16. A Mason, ‘The Australian Constitution 1901—1988, Australian Law Journal, Volume 62, October 1988, p. 753. 
17. Ibid., p. 753. 
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Rather than foreign affairs more broadly, Australia (and the other dominions) were given a degree of autonomy 
in relation to commercial treaties. Although the colonies did not have the power to enter into commercial 
treaties, as this could only be done by the Imperial Government, they did, have the relatively limited power not 
to be bound by commercial treaties to which Britain became a party.19  
So it was that the British Government of Herbert Asquith did not need to consult any of the colonial 
governments when making its declaration of war on Germany on 4 August 1914.20 
The Australian Government’s role was therefore only to determine the extent of its military contribution to the 
Imperial forces. In this context, on 3 August the federal Cabinet made two offers to the British Government: to 
place the Australian fleet under Admiralty control and to despatch an expeditionary force overseas.21 
Although some Australian Labor Party members and trade unionists (particularly those of Irish descent) 
expressed concern at the outset of the war about the level of Australia’s involvement and lack of consultation 
from Britain, it was only later in the war, and particularly after the heavy losses of Australian troops, that there 
was a more widespread sense in both Australia and the other dominions that their interests were not always the 
same as Britain’s. This led to increasing expectations that the Australian Government would be involved in 
decision-making. This saw the dominions being invited to attend meetings of an Imperial War Conference and an 
Imperial War Cabinet, as well as, after the war, Australia having separate representation at the Versailles Peace 
Conference.  
However, as Professor Beaumont points out, this was viewed as nationhood within the British Empire—not 
separate from it.22 
 
Executive and the parliament 
A third issue that continues to be controversial today is the extent to which the Australian Parliament, as distinct 
from the executive government, does or should play a role in decisions to commit troops to conflict. 
Under the Australian Constitution, the power to declare war is the prerogative of the executive arm of 
government, which as noted above, was the British Imperial Government for the purposes of foreign policy in 
1914. This reflects the view that the executive power of section 61 is taken to include all the ‘prerogatives of the 
Crown under the English common law’ including the power to make treaties with the governments of other 
countries and making war and peace.23  
As a matter of constitutional law, Parliament has no formal decision-making role. 
This is reflected in the fact that there was no debate in parliament before Australia’s entry into the war (noting 
though, that parliament was prorogued at the time). Similarly, when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
announced on 3 September 1939 that Britain was at war with Germany, Australia was again automatically at 
war, with Australia’s Prime Minister Robert Menzies announcing on the radio (one hour and fifteen minutes 
later): ‘it is my melancholy duty to inform you officially, that in consequence of a persistence by Germany in her 
invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war’.24 
Nevertheless, while parliamentary approval is not legally required, a democratic government in the Westminster 
tradition needs, as a matter of political reality, to enjoy the confidence of the lower house.25 As Lindell points 
out, parliament can move a motion of no-confidence in the government, but also has the power to ‘legislate to 
regulate and limit the exercise of prerogative powers’ such as those used to declare war, as well as continued 
18. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Trick or treaty? Commonwealth power to make and implement treaties, The Senate, 
Canberra, November 1995, para. 4.7. 
19. Ibid., para 4.10. 
20. Beaumont, ‘Unitedly we have fought’, op. cit., p. 399. 
21. Souter, op. cit., p. 138; Beaumont, op. cit., p. 399. 
22. Beaumont, Ibid., at p. 411. 
23. G Lindell, ‘The constitutional authority to deploy Australian military forces in the Coalition war against Iraq’, Constitutional Law and Policy 
Review, Vo. 5 No. 3., November 2002, p. 47. 
24. D McKeown and R Jordan, Parliamentary involvement in declaring war and deploying forces overseas, Background Note, Parliamentary Library, 
Canberra, 2010, p. 6. 
25. Lindell, op. cit., p. 47. 
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control over the expenditure of money to fight the war, and the power to hold inquiries under section 49 of the 
Constitution. These could investigate and report into the deployment of forces and the conduct of operations.26 
Accordingly, there are a number of times in Australia’s history that parliament has debated the issue. As Prime 
Minister Howard said in the context of the war in Iraq in 2003, while ‘the decision lies with the executive of 
government: the cabinet’ he ‘nevertheless [thought it] appropriate that the parliament, at the first opportunity, 
have the chance to debate this motion. It is essential that the reasons for that decision be made plain to the 
representatives of the people and that they have a full opportunity to debate them and to have their views 
recorded’.27 
This statement neatly describes the historical practice. As the Library’s paper on Parliamentary involvement in 
declaring war and deploying forces overseas shows, in the First World War the Governor General opened 
parliament on 8 October 1914, and the parliament debated a motion to agree to the Governor General’s 
address. In that instance, the government’s declaration to support Britain’s war effort with personnel and funds 
received bipartisan support in the Parliament, which reflected widespread public support. 
Similarly in the Second World War, Parliament met on 6 September 1939, three days after Australia’s declaration 
of war. Prime Minister Menzies tabled a White Paper and delivered a ministerial statement on the war in 
Europe.28 
The issue of parliament’s role in going to war remains periodically contentious. Minor parties have four times 
introduced Bills to remove the exclusive power of the executive to commit Australia to war: the Australian 
Democrats in 1985, and the Greens in 2003, 2008 and 2014.29 
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26. Ibid., p. 47. 
27. Quoted in G Williams, ‘The power to go to war: Australia in Iraq, Public Law Reporter, (2004) 15 PLR, p.5, at p. 6. The wording of motion moved 
is interesting. In Howard’s case it was ‘that the House take note of the paper’. The motion most frequently used is ‘that the paper [ministerial 
statement etc] be printed’. However the key point is that the Government of the day has never asked the Parliament to endorse its actions per 
se. 
28. McKeown and Jordan, op. cit., p. 6. 
29. Ibid., p. 3. 
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